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A new and powerful set of images of the South Pacific, and of Pacific
Islanders, has recently come to prominence in Australia. The images are
embedded in a forthright salvationist message that describes a region in
danger of “falling off the map.” It warns of an approaching “doomsday”
or “nightmare” unless Pacific Islanders remake themselves—just as Aus-
tralians have had to. Such a remaking, it is asserted, will require sacrifice:
a change in cultural practice, the taking of hard decisions, and the chang-
ing of unsound behaviors. Yet, not only can the nightmare be avoided
through right action, dreams can be realized. These ideas, of the kind
more generally associated with millenarian movements or nineteenth-cen-
tury missionaries, are coming from a most unlikely quarter. This is not yet
the imagery of Australian popular culture, which still holds to the idea of
paradise, but that of the heartland of “rational” thinking—the intersect-
ing worlds of the bureaucrat, the politician, the foreign affairs journalist,
and the academic economist.
This new doomsdayism1 depicts a region that is failing to become part
of the Pacific century. In the dramatic imagery associated with this con-
ception, the South Pacific is the “hole in the Asia-Pacific doughnut” or
“the eye in the Asia-Pacific cyclone.” It draws attention to what is seen as
a series of grim trends: a history of failure in development as measured by
growth in gross domestic product; “soaring” populations; unsustainable305
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306 the contemporary pacific • fall 1997exploitation of resources; the marginalization of island economies in a
changing global trading order; and a “fatal farewell” by old and powerful
aid donors following the end of the cold war. It asserts that the Pacific
Island countries are on a path to a future nightmare of overcrowding, pov-
erty, mass unemployment, serious environmental degradation, and a
decline in health standards. The only hope to avoid this future, it is con-
tended, is to open the island economies to the global market, effect struc-
tural change, jettison where necessary customary land tenure and inap-
propriate traditions, and connect with the dynamism of Asia.2
Like earlier Australian depictions of the Pacific Islands, the new dooms-
dayism provides an interesting sounding of how Australians see them-
selves. At the center of such conceptions has been an unquestioned, and
often unacknowledged, belief that Australia has a right, or even a duty, to
speak for the inhabitants of this region, to represent them to themselves
and to others, to lead, and to manage them. This belief was asserted long
before Australia had the power to enforce it, indeed even before Australia
was formally established in 1901, a tendency that Bismarck labeled the
Australasian Monroe Doctrine in the late-nineteenth century3 and one its
adherents saw as a form of “manifest destiny” (Thompson 1980, 25, 224).
Australian policymakers continued to assert this belief over the next cen-
tury, particularly at the end of the two world wars, and even more strong-
ly from the mid-1970s, when Australia saw itself as the natural leader of
the postcolonial South Pacific (Fry 1991, 1992). Although a familiar ten-
dency in white Australia’s approach to Aborigines (the parallels are strik-
ing),4 the islands region has been the only area outside the continent where
Australians have imagined themselves as colonizers and civilizers.
Such images do not simply provide interesting insights into the Austra-
lian imagination; they affect the lives of the people they depict. It has
mattered for Pacific Islanders when, at various times over the past two
hundred years, influential Australians have viewed them collectively as
savages, noble savages, children, or full human beings, and whether the
region was depicted as a defense shield, a frontier, vulnerable, empty, or
unstable. Each of these lenses allowed or encouraged different Australian
behavior toward Pacific Islanders: from colonial control and exploitation,
to protection, development, and the encouragement of self-determination.
Although some of these agendas have been developmental and benevolent-
ly intended, and others dominative and exploitative, I contend that they
all form part of a long-standing Australian practice of “framing” Pacific
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around them for purposes of making generalizations; second, intending to
shape the lives of the people so bounded; and third, in the colloquial
sense, setting them up for outcomes not of their making.
The doomsdayist conception appears to continue this practice. It is
intended to transform Pacific societies and, given the context in which it
is put forward, has the potential to significantly affect the parameters with-
in which future possibilities are worked out. Australia is, after all, the
largest aid donor to many island countries, as well as the principal funder
of the regional institutions.5 Moreover, the continuation of Australian aid
has been explicitly linked to the adoption by island governments and
regional institutions of the policies associated with this new depiction (Bil-
ney 1994b, 5; 1995b, 8).6 The doomsday conception also has the author-
ity of “knowledge.” It is not suggested simply as a possibility, but with
certainty and confidence about “how it is,” on the basis of academic in-
quiry and the hard-headed realism and rationalism of the key areas of
government and of the disciplinary focus of economics and demography.
As Epeli Hau‘ofa has noted, such authoritative depictions not only influ-
ence the behavior of the powerful; they have also in the past affected the
self-image of “subordinates,” whether images of darkness prior to Chris-
tianity being brought by the missionaries, images of inferiority captured,
for example, in the term boy to refer to an adult man, or the image of
“small is powerless” promoted by social scientists, consultants, interna-
tional agencies, and metropolitan governments in the postcolonial period
(Hau‘ofa 1994, 149).
The proponents claim that the depiction, and policy recommendations
flowing from it, have already been accepted by many of the key officials
and politicians in the area and that it has provided the basis for a reshap-
ing of the regional agenda “which marks a watershed in the evolution of
regional cooperation” (Bilney 1994b, 6; Callick 1994b). Whether or not
these claims are fully justified, it is certainly the case that the message has
been welcomed by some prominent island economists and officials. Sir
Mekere Morauta, then governor of the Bank of Papua New Guinea, for
example, stated at the launching of the Australian National University’s
Pacific 2010 project in June 1994 that “the doomsday scenario . . . is not
surrealistic. The seeds and signs of that scenario have been planted in
every Melanesian state, and are growing daily” (1994, 1). The notion has
provided the foundation for a number of regional initiatives through the
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tion of its more extreme claims by several Pacific prime ministers, includ-
ing Sitiveni Rabuka, Geoffrey Henry, Paias Wingti, and Solomon Mama-
loni; by President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara of Fiji; and by the rejection by
the Japanese, South Korean, and Malaysian governments of the dooms-
dayists’ portrayal of their respective countries.7 The new depiction has
also begun to influence the way the region is represented farther afield.
The Los Angeles Times, for example, drew on the doomsday conception
in its feature, “Heart of Pacific Awash in Poverty,” reproduced in the
Honolulu Advertiser (Wallace 1995).
I propose to consider the question of how the exercise of power inher-
ent in this new Australian representation of the Pacific Islands should be
judged. Is it subordinating? Does it amount to a form of cultural imperial-
ism or hegemony? Does it matter if it does? These questions can be given
more definition by considering particular issues raised in Epeli Hau‘ofa’s
essay, “Our Sea of Islands” (1994). Although Hau‘ofa was concerned
about the belittling tendency in past western conceptions of Pacific Island
societies and its subordinating impact on the self-image of Pacific Islanders,
the more recent “smallness” notion was of particular interest to him be-
cause of its contemporary significance in shaping how the postcolonial
Pacific has been seen by both outsiders and those who live there. The
“smallness” notion, he argued, underlay the social science understandings
of Pacific reality that he had himself been promoting to young Pacific
Islanders as a teacher in the regional university. What distressed him was
the disempowering effect of this conception: its determinism, he contended,
perpetuated dependency and subordination. His central theme was the
need to move beyond the belittlement associated with this dominant con-
ception. He ended with a plea to Pacific Islanders to never “allow anyone
to belittle us again.” This suggests a more specific focus to my question
about the new Australian representation: would it satisfy Hau‘ofa’s con-
cerns for knowledge that would move beyond the subordinating effect of
the policy-related social sciences in the postcolonial period of the 1970s
and 1980s?
The proponents of the new doomsdayism claim that it does. Far from
seeing their conception as inherently subordinating, they regard it as lib-
erating. They assert that the adoption of their characterization of Pacific
reality and of their prescriptions to avoid doomsday will lead to “self-reli-
ance” and engender Islander agency and responsibility rather than contin-
fry • australian images of the south pacific 309uing the acceptance of the structural obstacles of smallness (Callick
1994e, 55). Its critics, by contrast, are portrayed as patronizing and as
seeking to keep Pacific Islanders in subservience (Callick 1994b, 1994d).
They also claim benevolent intent, as a defense against claims of hegemony,
captured in the headline of Rowan Callick’s article defending the Austra-
lian campaign to make the new doomsdayism the basis of a new regional
order: “How Bilney, a Decent Man, Now Hopes to Make Island Life
Better” (1994e).
A further strand, implicit throughout the doomsdayist writings and in
the way the conception has been promoted, might be termed the “certain
knowledge” or “claim to truth” defense. The new conception, and the pol-
icy changes based on it, have the status of “knowledge” and the certainty
of science. They are said to face the unpleasant facts. The need for a dra-
matic revision of the way the region is understood, its proponents assert,
arises because there is a new reality in the islands region as a result of
global changes following the end of the cold war and the advent of a new
trading regime (Bilney 1994a; Callick 1993). Thus it becomes a duty to
reveal this knowledge to those affected and to make it clear that, whether
anyone likes it or not, nothing short of full acceptance is acceptable if
doomsday (predicted by science) is to be avoided. This, it is implied, is
not belittlement but rather telling it how it is.
I contest these claims. I develop the proposition that, while superfi-
cially the new doomsdayism constitutes a departure from the belittlement
associated with earlier Australian conceptions of the postcolonial Pacific,
in essence it is continued in the unacknowledged preconceptions on which
the new knowledge is built. For this reason I contend that the new con-
ception does not meet Hau‘ofa’s concern for moving beyond the subordi-
nating knowledge associated with the “smallness” notion of the cold war
years.
The Ethics of Representation
In thinking about the foundations on which judgments about the exercise
of power inherent in this new Australian representation of “the islands”
might be based, my theoretical point of departure is influenced by Edward
Said’s classic study of western conceptions of the orient (1978). Although
he focused on British, French, and American representations of the
Middle and Far East, Said’s ideas are relevant to other contexts in which
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the same time to manage, control, or prescribe for the peoples they are
depicting. Said was ultimately concerned with “how one can study other
cultures and peoples from a libertarian, or a non-repressive and non-
manipulative, perspective” (1978, 24, 328). The foundation of his ethics
is a liberal humanism (Clifford 1988, 263–264). His judgments about
western knowledge of the orient, or of any knowledge by one group
about another, are based on whether it contributes to belittlement, to
dehumanization, to suppression of the diversity of human experience, and
to an entrenchment of a subordinating relationship.
Said’s central thesis is that, in the case of Europeans and Americans
depicting the orient, this has never just been a harmless imagining about
far-off places: it contributed to, and became part of, the structure of
power. Said did not claim this hegemonic practice to be a particular vice
of westerners; nor, he contended, should it be seen as a practice that nec-
essarily accompanies the generation of knowledge about other cultures
(1978, 326–328). But, given western dominance in world politics over the
past several hundred years, he did see western knowledge of the orient as
a primary site for understanding cultural imperialism in contemporary
world politics. Said’s other major proposition about this knowledge was
that the depictions tell us more about European self-identity and self-
image than about any real orient or oriental. He argued that the orient
became the big “other” in the European imagination, against which Euro-
peans defined themselves, an invention for Europeans reflecting their
dominant ideas about themselves.
Said’s method for assessing whether knowledge practices might be
regarded as inherently subordinating was to examine the unacknowl-
edged epistemological premises, the subtle but powerful preconceptions
that become part of the structure of power over another people through
such things as images, construction of categories, and who is left in and
out. He was particularly concerned with what he contended were two
features of the orientalist knowledge system: first, the tendency to create a
mythical collective identity—the orient—and a mythical essentialized
person—the oriental—whom it then becomes possible to characterize,
and second, the tendency to consistently promote belittling, negative
images of these identities. This knowledge has an impact on the people so
depicted, he argued, not just because it informs and justifies colonial or
neocolonial practices through providing the lenses through which Euro-
fry • australian images of the south pacific 311peans see the orient, but because it begins to be taken on as a self-image
by those so depicted.
In adopting such an approach to judging contemporary Australian rep-
resentations of the Pacific Islands, however, I am mindful of several key
issues raised by Said’s critics. The first is the trap of “occidentalism” (see
Clifford 1988, 271), which Said himself warned against (1978, 328).
While attempting to retrieve nonwestern diversity and humanness from
the impact of orientalists, Said’s approach encouraged an image of an un-
differentiated totality called “the west”—a reverse orientalism. This sim-
ply does not reflect the complexity of western approaches to the nonwest-
ern world. As Nicholas Thomas has persuasively argued, “colonialism’s
culture,” and by extension, one could argue, contemporary imperialism’s
culture, was or is not only a plural society, varying over time and accord-
ing to agent and location, but there were or are also benevolently in-
tended colonial projects. These approaches were nevertheless hegemonic
in promoting essentialist collective identities and, for Thomas, their (nega-
tive) impact can still be felt today in liberal discourses on indigenous
peoples in their exclusion of the experiences of many indigenous people
(Thomas 1994, 1–32).
A study of Australian conceptions of the islands could easily fall into
the occidentalist trap, both in terms of assuming a homogeneous “Austra-
lia” and in seeing its framing practices as necessarily concerned with domi-
nation. I attempt to avoid this trap by making clear that I am focusing
only on certain sectors of Australian society: the media, the policy-related
social sciences, and the policymakers. Although I am aware that there are
different conceptions of the South Pacific at any one time within these
policy-related sectors, it is a central premise of this argument that one can
detect a dominant shared conceptualization among them that quickly
takes on the status of knowledge in a particular period. Thus, when I use
the shorthand “Australian depiction” I am referring to the characteriza-
tion of the South Pacific prevailing in these influential sectors. This is not
to deny the possibility of contending and influential conceptualizations of
the Pacific Islands elsewhere in Australian society, for example, in corpo-
rations, churches, the humanities, or popular culture. I also begin with
the assumption that not all of these Australian depictions are intended to
promote domination.
There is a related issue. The imaging of one group by another is not, of
course, a process that is confined to Europeans, or more particularly in
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(1994, 149). In the Pacific context, Rarotongans have been known to
characterize their compatriots from the northern Cook Islands in this
way; Papuans to speak disparagingly of Simbu; Polynesians of Melane-
sians; Solomon Islanders of the Gilbertese community in Honiara, or
Fijians of Indo-Fijians and vice versa. Pacific Islanders have also been
known to hold images of “the European”—the pâlagi, the papâlangi, dim
dim, or haole—that have sometimes been otherworldly, sometimes dis-
paraging, sometimes ridiculing (Hereniko 1994, 411). The crucial ques-
tion is whether such imaging occurs in a context of unequal power.
Where it does—and many of these situations are not devoid of unequal
power—I am assuming that ethical questions are raised concerning the
contribution of knowledge practices to the dominance of one people over
another.
A second issue raised by Said’s critics concerns his ambivalence on the
question of whether a critique of orientalist practices implies that there is
a true orient that is missed by the distorting lens of European preconcep-
tions. James Clifford has argued that although Said in his Nietzschian and
Foucauldian moments denied the possibility of there being a true orient,
he nevertheless implied that there is when he sought to demonstrate that
orientalism misrepresents Arab peoples, Islamic societies, or the nonwest
more generally (Clifford 1988, 260). This is an important issue and a dif-
ficulty that is constantly present in taking this approach to Australian
conceptions of the Pacific Islands. In examining the certainty with which
such conceptions are put forward I am proceeding on the assumption that
what is interesting is not whether the knowledge-makers got it right, but
the fact that they think there can be one true reality.
A third set of issues is raised by Aijaz Ahmad, who began from a more
antagonistic position to Said’s overall project. He argued that Said and his
followers were involved in romanticism, a form of third worldism in
which disaffected intellectuals in the diaspora construct a new subju-
gation of the east by the west, one that masks their own complicity in
the exploitative and ruthless relations within third world states and their
own positions as privileged people. Following this line, the critique of
western representations of the non-European world becomes a new form
of dependency theory, an attempt to place the blame for wrongs firmly on
the outside world rather than to sheet responsibility home to local elites
(Ahmad 1994, 165–167). In the South Pacific context, this takes the form
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reveals corruption and mismanagement in the islands, is to protect local
scoundrels. I proceed on the assumption that this does not necessarily fol-
low. It is, nevertheless, a powerful critique that at the very least should
draw attention to the pitfall of shifting responsibility totally from indige-
nous elites to western cultural imperialism. At the same time, to fully
adopt Ahmad’s perspective is to lose sight of outside knowledge as an im-
portant influence of the parameters within which societies make choices.
Drawing on Said’s general approach, I propose to explore four episte-
mological premises underlying contemporary Australian representations
of the South Pacific. These will form the bases for judgment about
whether these representations are potentially subordinating. The first is
the degree to which a mythical Pacific Island person and society are
created, and diversity suppressed. To presume the existence of something
called “the South Pacific” need not necessarily lead to stereotyping of the
peoples and societies within it. The extraordinary diversity—of cultural
and linguistic forms, of resource endowments and geographical features,
and of colonial experience—has been, after all, a major attraction for
many of those calling themselves Pacific scholars. In such an approach,
the region becomes a handy comparative frame as long as the basis of its
construction is remembered. In contrast, the move concerned with per-
sonifying the South Pacific, and the accompanying tendencies to create a
mythical Pacific Island state, person, and society, and consequently to
suppress diversity, raises important issues. If the knowledge it is built on
bears little resemblance to the experience of any society, this has implica-
tions for the claim to truth. If it proceeds on the basis of generalizing from
one or two known experiences, it also excludes the experiences of others
who do not fit the stereotype. Furthermore, it introduces essentialism. As
soon as characteristics are attributed to these mythical categories, this
knowledge not only produces the deduction that any particular Pacific
Islander has these characteristics, but that they have them because they
are “Islanders.”
The second premise concerns how Pacific Islanders and their societies
are imaged. To what degree are such depictions consistently dehumaniz-
ing and belittling? The denial of humanity implicit in the folding of all
Pacific Island persons into one identity, and the attribution of an essen-
tialist character to that identity, is magnified if that depiction is consis-
tently disparaging or belittling. Imagery can set people up for particular
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questioned by those employing it. It becomes the handy summary about a
place or people that becomes the unexamined starting point for policy-
makers. Said built his case against orientalism largely by showing the con-
sistently negative imagery applied to the orient, imagery that reinforced
the idea of a superior Europe and an inferior orient and denied the nor-
mal range of human character and abilities. This was seen by many critics
as ignoring the many scholars of the orient who did not indulge in racist
or other types of imagery enforcing a superior–inferior divide. I am per-
suaded by those who, while sympathetic to the issues Said raised, are
starting from the premise that the west, like the orient, is a more complex
place. I therefore pose the question in an open-ended way: to what extent
does the imagery associated with the new doomsdayism reinforce an
implicit subordination of Pacific Island peoples?
A third line of inquiry focuses on the relationship that the framers of
the knowledge define between themselves and the frame. In particular, the
construction of a division between a superior “us” and an inferior “them”
is accentuated by the degree to which there is a denial of shared humanity
on the part of the framers, in the sense of a preparedness to place their
own experience and problems up for depiction alongside the others about
which they are constructing knowledge. In the case of Australians depict-
ing the South Pacific, because of the geographical location of Australia in
relation to the region they are characterizing, this attitude may be ex-
pressed by whether or not they place Australia within the boundaries of
“the South Pacific.”
Finally, I consider preconceptions concerning certainty of knowledge
and the claims of science. To what extent do Australian representations
claim to provide the one true reality of Pacific Island experience rather
than a perspective built on particular epistemological and ideological pre-
conceptions? Before exploring these unacknowledged preconceptions em-
bedded in the new doomsdayism, I shall sketch the origins and develop-
ment of the conception, its main tenets and normative underpinnings.
The Doomsday Depiction
The doomsday image was initially sketched in 1993 by Rowan Callick, a
prominent economics journalist and Pacific commentator who was asked
by the Australian National University’s Pacific 2010 project to draw a
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tions of the Pacific 2010 researchers (Callick 1993). In summary form, as
it appears on the cover of the first Pacific 2010 publication, the “dooms-
day scenario,” said to arrive by 2010, is:
Population growth in the Pacific Islands is careering beyond control: it has
doubled to 9 million: malnutrition is spreading and is already endemic in
squatter settlements. . . . there are beggars on the streets of every South Pacific
town. . . . levels of unemployment are high. . . . expenditure on education has
tripled, although there are still no government welfare payments. . . . deaths
from aids, heart disease and cancers have greatly increased, government ser-
vices have been privatized or in many cases have lapsed. . . . aid donors have
turned their attention elsewhere. . . . crime has increased. . . . trade in narcotics,
marijuana, kava and betel nut has produced its first island millionaires.
. . . pollution and land degradation has spiralled. . . . much of the surviving
rainforest has been logged. . . . coastal fisheries have been placed under threat
from over fishing . . . skills shortages in the labour market yawn wide. (Cole
1993)
Although it is the image of a future nightmare that captures attention,
Callick also painted a graphic picture of the contemporary South Pacific
on its way to this future. He described the “grim trends” that are the
“signs and seeds” of the doomsday scenario: population growth “career-
ing . . . out of control,” the lack of structural adjustment in island econo-
mies in the face of a changing economic and strategic order, and serious
environmental problems. The image is of an island region not facing up
to its responsibilities at a time when outside interest in the Pacific Islands
is waning and the impact is being felt of “the frenetic globalization of
economic life.” Callick did not, however, see the doomsday scenario as
inevitable if Pacific leaders were to take urgent action “before looming
disasters impose their own grim patterns” and “the nightmare becomes
reality.” The “essential joint ingredients for solutions to the South Pacific
nightmare,” he claimed, lie in economic restructuring and appropriate
population policies and “an active strategy on the environment.” The
focus, however, was on structural adjustment:
The required reforms may best be delivered together, for presentation pur-
poses, as a single package. They may ultimately involve tighter budgetary dis-
cipline, measures to enhance competitiveness, corporatization and privatiza-
tion, reform of the financial sector, adjustment of exchange rates, alteration of
the way wages are determined and reorganization of government priorities so
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infrastructure. . . .
The success stories, economically and politically, will be those emphasizing
openness and links—trade, investment, even the movement of skilled workers,
foreigners and nationals, in and out of the country—rather than those empha-
sizing a defiant independence.
A greater focus within the region on free trade would help to frame the
right mentality. (Callick 1993, 10–11)
The Pacific 2010 project, of which this was a part, was financed by the
government’s aid delivery body, the Australian International Develop-
ment Assistance Bureau (later called Ausaid). Its purpose was to set before
Pacific leaders the research findings on the major trends in their societies
and the implications for policy to the year 2010. The project has had a
high profile. It was launched at Parliament House, and its various studies
have been widely disseminated in the region. The new conception had
been raised to a high rung of influence when its themes were taken up by
Minister for Pacific Islands Affairs the Honorable Gordon Bilney, in his
address to the Foreign Correspondents’ Association in Sydney in June 1994
(Bilney 1994a). Broadcast by satellite to Pacific Island representatives
assembled in island capitals, the speech was intended as a landmark state-
ment setting out the broad assumptions of future Australian policy toward
the region. It focused on what the minister regarded as “a number of key
factors which must be addressed by island governments with a sense of
urgency if sustainable development is to be achieved in the South Pacific.”
Despite the minister’s claim that he was not seeking “to paint a picture of
a region in a state of crisis,” he gave the impression that such a crisis was
imminent unless urgent action were taken along the lines he sketched.
The air of impending doom was given further embellishment in the news-
paper headlines: “Visions of Paradise Blur as South Pacific Sails off the
Map” (Wright 1994); “Pacific Islands Face Nightmare without Change,
Says Bilney” (Gill 1994); “Pacific Islands Face Nightmare Future” (Perry
1994); “South Pacific Policies Not Working: Bilney” (O’Callaghan 1994a);
and “Paradise Lost in the South Pacific” (Sydney Morning Herald, 20 June
1994).
Later in the year, Australia’s Prime Minister Keating and Minister Bil-
ney vigorously promoted the new conception as the underlying rationale
for a new regional economic order at the South Pacific Forum in Brisbane
(Fry 1994). The resultant reform agenda focused on rationalization of the
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ity and returns in the timber and fisheries sectors. The media again took
up the themes of a failed region heading toward a grim future, most influ-
entially perhaps in the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s Lateline tele-
vision program, “Pacific Nightmare,” in which three Pacific prime minis-
ters were questioned on what they were doing about this new Pacific
“reality” following an introduction featuring Callick’s doomsday scenario
(abc 1994). If anything, the Australian government’s resolve to promote
these ideas strengthened in 1995. They were expressed multilaterally in
the efforts to implement some of the regimes and other decisions resulting
from the Brisbane Forum in such areas as civil aviation rationalization,
public sector finance, sustainable forestry and fisheries management, as
well as in attempts to take the reform agenda further at the Madang Forum
in September. They were also expressed in the intense campaign to have
an Australian gain the position of secretary-general in the South Pacific
Commission, thereby reversing a long-established convention that the post
be filled by a Pacific Islander (Fry 1997).8
What had emerged by 1995 was a shared depiction in key areas of aca-
demia, government, and media about the South Pacific and its future.
This shared conviction was not due simply to the common appeal of some
persuasive ideas. These were not entirely watertight sectors of Australian
society. Importantly, Rowan Callick, a key maker of the images of the
new doomsdayism, and its strongest and most consistent defender, had a
significant role in each sector: as part of the Pacific 2010 academic project,
as a member of the minister’s aid advisory council, and as the main inter-
pretative media commentator, in both the most influential financial news-
paper in Australia and the main monthly reaching island elites. Callick
was not simply acting as a scribe drawing out the implications of the
Pacific 2010 research. It is evident from his other articles, before and after
the Pacific 2010 chapter, that he was a major independent force in devel-
oping the new doomsdayism conceptually and presentationally. It also
mattered that the Pacific 2010 academic project was Ausaid-financed in
terms of the authority given its findings in the minister’s approach and in
the publicity given to its findings.
The new doomsdayism is as much a picture of the contemporary South
Pacific as it is of a possible future scenario. This picture can usefully be
considered as comprising three constitutive images. The first is that of the
failed region. Here, the picture is one of an economically stagnant region.
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ments of the South Pacific condition, and particularly from its notion of
“the Pacific paradox” (World Bank 1993, ix, 1). As described by Minister
Bilney, the paradox is that “over the past decade most Pacific Island
countries have achieved only slow growth in real per capita incomes
despite a generally favourable natural and human resource endowment,
high levels of external assistance and generally sound economic manage-
ment” (1994a, 5). He went on to claim that the World Bank’s 1993 report
estimated that “real gross national product in Pacific Island countries
grew by an average rate of only about 0.1% annually over the previous
ten years.” (The Bank’s actual figure was 2.1 percent. The figure of 0.1
percent referred to gross domestic product per capita). Again following
the World Bank, the comparative “success” in growth terms of other
island countries in the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean was introduced as
evidence of South Pacific failure.
The emphasis on economic growth was tempered, however, by a con-
cern with sustainability. The doomsdayists, like the World Bank, present a
picture of failure on this score, particularly in the forestry and fisheries
sectors. In the case of timber, attention is drawn to “the pressing risk of
blanket destruction [of] the region’s rare and diverse forests [due to] rapa-
cious exploitation for profit by unscrupulous foreign operators” (Bilney
1994b, 12) and the connivance on the part of corrupt politicians in these
activities. Again echoing the bank’s broadened interests in recent years,
the doomsdayist depiction presented a picture of serious environmental
degradation. The minister, for example, listed a catalogue of environmen-
tal problems that he felt the region needed to face up to: “deforestation,
coastal pollution and degradation, depletion of inshore fisheries and dam-
age to coral reefs, inadequate watershed management, a shortage of clean
drinking water and effective waste management facilities, all underpinned
as it were by the possible effects of global climate change” (Bilney 1994a,
8). It was also contended that in the case of tuna, there has been a failure
to obtain sufficient return, particularly from Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.
Other areas of failure contributing to the poor overall economic per-
formance, it was argued, include an inefficient and bloated public sector,
“stop-gap measures” and “haphazard and uncoordinated development
efforts,” corrupt leadership, inefficient regional structures, “extravagant
national symbols” (Bilney 1994a, 14), and, in particular, inefficient and
costly national airlines whose combined losses in 1994, it was claimed,
totaled more than Australian aid to the South Pacific in the same year.
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were recognized in passing, the explanation for failure was put more in
terms of inappropriate policy frameworks and cultural practices, and an
inflexible customary land tenure (Bilney 1994a, 6, 13). The 1994 formu-
lations emphasized inappropriate policy frameworks as the problem, and
island economic management, following the World Bank report, was
judged to be “generally sound” (Bilney 1994a, 5), yet a few months later
Bilney was describing island management as “muddling-through” and
was arguing that “the overall record of economic management and per-
formance is poor and the Pacific tendency towards pragmatism and the
Australian equivalent of ‘she’ll be right mate’ mentality, cannot mask
these problems indefinitely” (1994b, 3).
Callick also shifted from a focus on inappropriate policies to a failure
in leadership. He began to point to specific shared characteristics of island
leaders, who “have a tradition of agreeing, then doing the opposite, or
more likely, nothing. . . . And even minor multilateral progress leads to
more, practically, than local measures—more prone to backflips, inaction
and sheer bribery” (1995). This had become a failure born of the essential
nature of Pacific Islanders rather than inappropriate frameworks, a
departure from the World Bank picture.
A second image is that of a region whose population is “soaring” (Cos-
tello 1995, 8). On the basis of the projections of the Pacific 2010 demog-
raphers, Callick suggested a near doubling of the population of “the
islands” (leaving aside the French territories and Micronesia) to nine mil-
lion people. Of the situation as he wrote, he claimed, again on the basis of
Pacific 2010 research, that “the region’s population growth is careering,
albeit happily for now, out of control” (Callick 1993, 2, 8; my emphasis).
Professor Ron Duncan, the director of the National Centre for Develop-
ment Studies (the source of Pacific 2010) was reported as saying that “the
Pacific Islands are at a stage where population growth means that their
standard of living has fallen below what it was in the 1980s” (Wallace
1995, A7). This Malthusian picture was also a central aspect of Bilney’s
depiction of the region (1994a, 9).
The third image is that of the marginalized region (Bilney 1994a, 4) or,
as put more graphically by some, a region that is “falling off the map”
(Wright 1994; abc 1994, 3). Several propositions underlie this picture. The
starting point is the claim that, following the end of the cold war, great
power interest is waning or will wane. This is a tendency referred to by
Rowan Callick as “the fatal farewell,” to indicate that just as the coming
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“fatal impact,” their departure is causing fatal consequences of a different
kind (1994e, 55). He had in mind the departure of the economic assis-
tance, trade concessions, and investment that, he contended, kept the
island countries afloat during the cold war. In support of his claim he
cited the closing down of the US aid offices in the South Pacific, British
withdrawal from the South Pacific Commission, and the end of Russian
involvement in the region. This, it was argued, creates a very different sit-
uation in which island states can no longer rely on external subsidies to
make up for their own inefficiencies.
The picture of a marginalized region also drew on a contention con-
cerning the implications of a changing global trading regime following the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It has
been argued that the island economies will fall increasingly behind in a
liberalized trading order unless they make the necessary reforms. A perti-
nent example of such marginalization was given in the erosion of the
value of trade preferences for island countries under the sparteca trading
arrangement with Australia. There was also the claim of marginalization
within the dynamic Asia-Pacific economy, represented as resulting from a
failure to make appropriate domestic adjustments to “capitalise on these
new trade openings” and also as a failure “to make the necessary connec-
tions with the larger nations of the Asia-Pacific rim” (Bilney 1995b, 9).
I have shown that Callick, in his original statement of the doomsday
scenario, saw the answer to this post–cold war vulnerability in the appli-
cation of Australia’s domestic reform strategy writ large, in particular,
public sector reform and private sector development in an open economy.
Minister Bilney went a little further, suggesting that island leaders may
need to consider the appropriateness of maintaining “extravagant national
symbols” such as airlines, of traditional land use patterns where they are
incompatible with the needs of investors, and of sheltering behind a “for-
tress of tradition” (1994a, 13–14; 1995, 10). “Island countries,” Bilney
argued, “may need to ask themselves, as Australians have had to do in
recent years, whether some old social and economic habits and attitudes
might need to be adapted or even abandoned” (1994a, 7). Callick also
saw cultural change as crucial: The South Pacific “standing on its own two
feet means, above all, accelerating the conceptual shift on the part of the
region’s decision makers, from a traditional emphasis on the importance
of distribution of wealth . . . to an emphasis on production” (1993, 7).
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solution to the perceived population problem: It “entails, above all, con-
vincing islanders that their country’s economic future is bright, and they
will not need to rely on a large number of children as their only route to
long-term security” (1993, 8). At heart, this conception is informed by
the neoclassical model of development. This was not a new emphasis for
the National Centre for Development Studies, which since 1987 had been
the most influential academic voice attempting to move the conceptual-
ization of Pacific Island development away from the assumptions of
“smallness” and toward World Bank thinking. What was new was the
dramatic imagery and the air of crisis about what would happen if struc-
tural adjustment were not implemented.
The new depiction of the South Pacific has been accompanied by
ambivalent images of “Asia” and “Asians.” On the one hand, as I have
shown, Asia is seen as the source of dynamism with which the islands
must engage, and as a model of success. On the other hand, the dooms-
dayists promote a very strong image of Asians as predators, as unruly
capitalists and exploiters, to be controlled and guarded against. The cri-
tique of Malaysian logging firms shades into a critique of the Malaysian
government, and of Japanese and Korean tuna boats into an attack on the
Japanese and Korean governments, and in some accounts, all of this
becomes unwanted “Asian” involvement, to be warned against. During
the Brisbane Forum, for example, Prime Minister Keating was reported as
having “attacked Malaysian, Japanese, Indonesian and Korean com-
panies for their rampant exploitation of the South Pacific forests and fish-
eries” (O’Callaghan 1994b, c) and Callick referred to “the Asian fleets
plundering the resource for tiny bilateral licences” (1994c, my emphasis).
“Asia” has been presented as providing both threat and opportunity.
Despite Callick’s call for open economies that will connect with Asian
capitalism, for example, he viewed the first significant evidence of such a
connection as one of the major “headaches” for Minister Bilney. He
described the headache as “our new Asian chums are starting to rampage
through the region’s resources in a freebooting style similar to that of the
European pirates of a century ago” (1994a). He also made Asian involve-
ment in the region part of his “nightmare” scenario for the year 2010:
“The region’s increasingly close integration into East Asia has led to a
change in diet, with more spices now used in cooking, and to a greater
number of Asian workers arriving. Some artisans stay on after being
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capital” (Callick 1993, 5).
The negative portrayal of Asia is accentuated by a curious silence in the
doomsdayist depiction. In all the talk of resource depletion, environmen-
tal degradation, and corruption there is no mention of the largest involve-
ment of outside capital in Pacific resources, that of Australian company
investment in mining.
The proponents of the doomsdayist characterization claimed it to be a
significant departure from the dominant Australian depiction of the
South Pacific during the cold war years in several ways: It is focused on
the economy rather than on security, and sees the developmental answers
in outward-looking strategies rather than the inward-looking policies of
the past. It sees itself as moving beyond the idea that “small is power-
less,” that island states are victims of the world system, and that they con-
stitute a unique case. Under this characterization all island states can
achieve good growth figures; it is just a matter of employing the right
policy settings. The task the Australian Labor government had set itself,
according to Callick, was “to transform the old post-colonial focus on
equity into one of governance” (1995). Callick also argued that the new
conditions necessarily involve the jettisoning of “old concepts of sover-
eignty” (1994d). By contrast with earlier conceptions, the South Pacific
referred to is the independent Pacific only, that is, the fourteen island
member countries of the South Pacific Forum.
At a general level, the normative concerns underlying the depiction—
“sustainable development,” “making island life better,” “good gover-
nance,” “self-reliance,” and an “end to mendicancy”—are all goals that
in one form or another have been espoused by all sides of the develop-
ment debate in the South Pacific. Many of the problems described—cor-
ruption, deforestation, pollution, population pressures, employment, and
obtaining a decent return on the fisheries—are issues of concern to most
participants in the debate. The differences emerge in relation to how these
participants characterize the contemporary situation and how they see
Pacific societies proceeding from that situation to these desired ends.
Rather than exploring the critique that these other development perspec-
tives might offer in regard to the explicit tenets of the new doomsdayism,
I now develop a critique at the level of preconception, or unquestioned
assumption.
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The first of these preconceptions concerns how the category of “region”
is conceptualized. In this, the new doomsdayism is unequivocal. It is built
on an undifferentiated notion of region. In a process described by Cook
Islands Prime Minister Sir Geoffrey Henry as having “thrown a net across
the Pacific” (Pacific Report, 15 Aug 1994, 5), the new doomsdayism
reduces the complexity and diversity of this area to simple depictions of
“the South Pacific,” “the Pacific Island state,” “economy,” or “leader.”
Whether in the general statements of the Pacific 2010 project, ministerial
statements, or the main newspaper and television commentary, “the
region” has been spoken of without recognizing any categories of differ-
ence. This implied uniformity predisposes those receiving these authorita-
tive depictions to imagine each island country as having a rapidly disap-
pearing forest as a result of irresponsible management of the timber
industry (when most island countries do not even have a timber industry
or substantial forest to exploit); as having a poorly managed airline run-
ning at a substantial loss; as being led by “corrupt” and inept leaders who
“say one thing and do another”; as exhibiting a “muddling-through”
style of management; as never having attempted public-sector reform or
export-led development; as having a very high population growth and a
stagnant economy. Yet this general picture does not fit the experience of
any particular country.
The depiction of the situation regarding population is a particularly
pertinent example because perceived high population growth was what
prompted the Pacific 2010 project’s doomsday scenario. The region is
depicted as becoming overcrowded, and the individual Pacific Island coun-
try’s population as “soaring.” A closer look at the research on which the
doomsday scenario is based reveals that what was being talked about
were seven countries out of the fourteen in the islands region: Fiji, West-
ern Samoa, Tonga, Kiribati, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, and Solomon
Islands. In two of these cases—Western Samoa and Tonga—it was con-
cluded that net population growth is quite low. The South Pacific general-
ization, and the image of a mythical Pacific Island state, was made on the
basis of projections for five countries.
This problem is underlined by contrasting the doomsdayist imagery of
an overcrowded South Pacific with the image presented by Professor R G
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before the Pacific 2010 doomsday scenario (1989). Ward argued that the
problem for the South Pacific is an emptying out of the islands. In the text
he was explicit that his conclusions were drawn mainly from an assess-
ment of Micronesian and Polynesian countries (about two-thirds of the
region’s countries), but in the heading and general argument the impres-
sion was given of a generalization for the whole South Pacific entirely at
odds with the picture presented by the Pacific 2010 project:
However, perhaps 100 years hence . . . almost all of the descendants of today’s
Polynesian and Micronesian islanders will live in Auckland, Sydney, San Fran-
cisco and Salt Lake City. Occasionally they may recall that their ancestors
once lived on tiny Pacific Islands. Even more occasionally they may visit the
resorts which, catering for scuba divers, academic researchers, or gamblers,
may provide the only permanent human activities on lonely Pacific Islands, set
in an empty ocean. (Ward 1989, 245)
One possible explanation of the generation of the region-wide general-
izations in the new doomsdayism is that they reflect an Australian offi-
cial, academic, and media perception of Papua New Guinea writ large. As
a massive assistance-giver and with, to this point, most going as budget-
ary aid over which Australia has no say, this could reflect Australian frus-
tration with problems in Papua New Guinea and a feeling that Papua New
Guinea is wasting Australia’s money. A second explanation is a slightly
expanded version of the first. It reflects a perception of the Melanesian
countries writ large to cover all island countries of the Forum region.
Helen Fraser has claimed that “Australian officials have acknowledged
privately that the [Bilney] speech was written primarily with Papua New
Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Fiji, and Vanuatu in mind (‘the countries
that are important to Australia’ as one official put it)” (Fraser 1994, 3).
She asked, “What does this imply about the importance to Australia of
its relations with nine other Forum member countries?” Her view is sup-
ported by the generalizations made about population growth that were
mainly drawn from Melanesian experience, and the preoccupation with
timber, a Melanesian resource. But there is the anomaly of Papua New
Guinea having a 14 percent economic growth rate in 1993, the highest in
the world. This was not generalized to the region, though the mismanage-
ment associated with the Papua New Guinea economy was. This suggests
a third way in which such generalizations are generated—taking a worst
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crowding, the Marshall Islands for polluted lagoons, Polynesian Airlines
for airline mismanagement, and so on. The abstract Pacific Island state
and the mythical Pacific Island person thus become a composite of worst
cases. The denial of diversity is also encouraged by the ideology underly-
ing the doomsdayist depiction. Central to that ideology is the assumption
that all are equal under the market, and that whatever the starting place,
the solution is the same.
In this preconception, the new doomsdayism continues the approach of
the previous dominant depiction of the postcolonial period. In their efforts
to create the idea of the South Pacific as a strategic entity, development
unit, and management area during the 1970s and 1980s, Australian policy-
makers and policy-related social scientists tended to reduce the wide vari-
ety of regional circumstances to a simple stereotyped island society, and a
unidimensional native person. Particularly during the cold war, which
dominated the thinking of 1976–1988, Australian policy approaches were
built on extremely generalized images of the region and on the existence
of a typical Pacific Island state, economy, and leader. While the academic
development literature had admitted some diversity in resource endow-
ments and potential, it adopted a more general proposition stifling diver-
sity as part of the main discourse and imagery of the South Pacific—that
of nonviability and vulnerability for all island states. This was particu-
larly so in the strategic studies literature, which was the discipline closest
to the depictions prominent in media and government circles (Fry 1993,
231–232).
This type of framing dominated in Australian policy circles for much of
the postcolonial period, except for a brief period, from 1988 to 1993,
when some questioning of this premise occurred. Under the leadership of
new Foreign Affairs Minister Senator Gareth Evans, and reflecting a view
already held in the Pacific Islands branch of his department, there emerged
an official recognition of the diversity and complexity of the societies and
peoples of the South Pacific. This was first set out in the doctrine of “con-
structive commitment” announced by Evans in September 1988. In his
speech to the Foreign Correspondents’ Association, shortly after becom-
ing minister, Evans reported on his recent travels through the islands:
I saw for myself the real individuality of the countries of the South West
Pacific, an individuality which underlined the error of some past Australian
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guishable—islands. . . .
Too often the very real differences between, for example, even such near
Polynesian neighbours as Tonga and Western Samoa, or such near Melanesian
neighbours as Vanuatu and the Solomons, have been overlooked in gener-
alised, not to mention romanticised, views of the Pacific. (Evans 1988, 347)
Although Minister Bilney claimed in 1994 that the government’s new
policy approach was a continuation of the constructive commitment doc-
trine, with appropriate adjustments for the global changes that have
occurred since the Evans statement (1994a), the new conception in fact
constituted a return to the dominant Australian mode of framing the
islands through stereotype.
Framing and Belittlement
In relation to the second preconception, concerning the degree to which
Pacific Islanders are consistently belittled in the imagery associated with
the depiction, the evidence is more mixed. On the one hand, it contains
an egalitarian image of “the Pacific Islander” and the Pacific Island state.
This was advanced by Minister Bilney and by Rowan Callick as a positive
departure from previous depictions. No longer are island countries to be
seen as restricted by the paternalistic notion of “smallness”; rather they
should all be seen as having equal potentiality to develop if they change
themselves and jettison old notions of sovereignty and restricting tradi-
tions. These images, however, like earlier missionary images, are concerned
with potential equality if Pacific Islanders do what Australians advise.
The doomsdayist images of Islanders now, and in the recent past, tell a
different story. As I have shown, these are consistently disparaging and
employ many of the familiar stereotypes. The general picture is that Pacific
Island leaders are corrupt, “muddlers-through,” administratively incom-
petent, irresponsible, duplicitous, uncaring about their children’s futures
and that they have failed to deliver “development.” In the two key dooms-
dayist documents, Callick’s doomsday scenario and Minister Bilney’s
address to the Foreign Correspondents’ Association, there are no positive
images of the current or past leadership. All development efforts of the
past decades have simply failed. The presentation of various Australian
proposals for regional and national strategies—for example, on fisheries,
public-sector reform, privatization, export-oriented development, and con-
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having been attempted in these areas before. There is even a hint of the
long-standing image of the childlike Islander in Bilney’s speech, where he
argued that “spoon-feeding will no longer get island countries where they
want to go,” and in Keating’s surprise in speaking of the capacities of the
island leaders in the 1994 South Pacific Forum: “And the thing that
impressed me, I must say, particularly, was the political will that they all
showed in seeking to meet those challenges and their willingness to actu-
ally grasp the nettle on big problems” (Keating 1994, 2; my emphasis).
The doomsdayist imagery is not just consistently disparaging and nega-
tive; it is also imagery that is exaggerated and otherworldly. Even those
institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,
that share many of the same concerns, do not use this sort of imagery,
preferring the normal terms used to describe perceived problems in other
parts of the world (for example, Brown 1995, 1–2). While embracing the
doomsday imagery, newspaper editors, television producers, and speech
writers have not been able to let go of the paradise image. Minister Bilney,
for example, after describing the “dismal result” of island development in
the past decade, added “Paradise it’s not” (1994b, 21); a Sydney Morning
Herald editorial was headed “Paradise Lost in the South Pacific” (29 June
1994, 10); Kerry O’Brien, in introducing the “Pacific Nightmare” Late-
line program, referred to “the fading image of South Pacific paradise”
(abc 1994, 1); and Meet the Press presenter Barrie Cassidy introduced the
topic of the evening as “troubles in paradise” (Network Ten, 1). The im-
pression was given that paradise was some actual recent past state rather
than an invention of the European imagination. The fall to a nightmare
state seems greater when the move is from paradise—from one mythical
and otherworldly extreme to another—than if societies with various prob-
lems were said to move to a situation where some problems were accen-
tuated and others declined. Ultimately the fall is from the paradise of the
European imagination.
In this respect, the new doomsdayism is a continuation of the imagery
of the cold war period. The advent of a postcolonial South Pacific did not
put an end to depictions of Pacific Islanders as inferior in Australian offi-
cial discourse, media imagery, or strategic studies. Indeed, cold war lenses,
and the Australian government’s developing self-image as leader (for the
first time) of the region, encouraged the continuation of belittling images,
and a sidelining even of images of potential equality. A geopolitical con-
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tendency to view the region through a “balance of power” lens, in which
Pacific Islanders were largely absent as a serious presence. Where Pacific
Islanders and Pacific Island states appeared in this depiction, they were
seen as vulnerable to entreaty, with the potential to inadvertently upset
the balance through ignorance or inexperience.
Implicit in Australian policy and media opinion was the image of the
island state as only worthy of second-class citizenship in international
society. Australian governments under Liberal and Labor parties attempted
to apply a disciplinary regime that expected behavior of island states not
expected of Australia. For example, trade or fishing agreements with the
Soviet Union were considered taboo, as was the establishment of a Soviet
embassy in the islands region. The approach by the Soviet Union to Kiri-
bati was assumed to lead inexorably to a military base. The Kiribati leader-
ship was assumed to be gullible and easily manipulated. Independent or
nonaligned talk, common throughout the third world, was viewed as
pro-Soviet rather than as issuing from the independent capacity of island
leaders to have their own opinions and agendas. Pacific Island states, and
Pacific Islanders, were portrayed as passive and childlike. A Pacific strate-
gic personality, influenced by the Grenada episode of 1983, was married
to the already existing notion of the Pacific economic person developed
in economics, and to the “smallness” notion dominant in development
studies. The imagery applied to the region as a whole was dramatic and
exaggerated and bore little resemblance to the actual experiences of any
part of it (Fry 1992).
The imagery associated with Evans’s constructive commitment doctrine
at the close of the cold war constituted a departure from this tradition.
Not only did it reestablish a visible Pacific Islander and a Pacific Island
state through its emphasis on diversity and complexity, it also introduced
empowering images. No longer were Pacific Islanders portrayed as pas-
sive or childlike. There was a recognition of sovereignty. This was a prod-
uct of a reevaluation of Australia’s role because, although Australia had
still seen itself as leading the South Pacific toward the end of the cold war,
the island states were no longer following. In Evans’s 1988 idea of “part-
nership” and denial of “hegemony” was an implicit recognition of equal-
ity, although, as I have argued elsewhere, there were in his 1989 regional
security policy still vestiges of the Australian Monroe Doctrine that im-
plied an inferior island region (Fry 1991). Again, then, the new dooms-
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and a departure from the Evans era.
The Framer and the Frame
The third epistemological premise concerns the relationship the framers
assume between themselves and the frame. In the cold war years, Austra-
lia (whether in government, academe, or media) continued to place itself
firmly outside the region in its conceptions of “the South Pacific.” While
it aspired to leadership of the islands area, it viewed itself as quite distinct
from “them.” Cold war thinking accentuated this self-image of being out-
side the framed region (while seeing itself as manager of it). As seen from
Canberra, “the South Pacific” (not Australia) was seen as vulnerable and
potentially unstable and its economies as nonviable, and therefore partic-
ular standards should be expected of island state international behavior
not expected of itself or other western nations. Although the notion of
“one strategic entity” was promoted by Australian defense planners, it
was evident that they had in mind a two-tier region with Australia (and
New Zealand) having different rights and obligations (Dibb 1989, 66, 70).
Increasingly in the 1980s, Australia began to place itself inside the re-
gional frame, but only for certain purposes. It did so particularly on
nuclear issues, where it began to speak of “we” in the South Pacific. This
was reflected in Australia placing itself within the regional boundary of
the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and placing its east coast in
the South Pacific’s antidumping regime under the Convention for the Pro-
tection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific.
When Senator Evans became foreign minister he attempted to make this
conceptual shift a more conscious move. In his speech to the Foreign Cor-
respondents’ Association in September 1988, significantly titled “Australia
in the South Pacific,” he explicitly acknowledged the need for Australia to
be part of a regional identity, as part of moving away from the hegemonic
approaches of the past (Evans 1988).
The new doomsdayism appeared at first sight to continue the trend
established by Senator Evans, and the more consultative approaches to
conceptualizing regional security toward the end of the cold war (for
example, Polomka and Hegarty 1989). As I have shown, Minister Bilney
couched Australia’s right to speak on Pacific Island futures on the fact
that Australia has had to adjust to global change and take the hard road
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the frame. But what was put in were the successes, not the failures or con-
tinuing problems. The whole tenor of the new doomsdayism is that it is
“we” in Australia who have succeeded who are depicting “you” in the
South Pacific who have failed. The return to the “them” and “us” of the
cold war period is symbolized in the title of the minister’s address to the
Foreign Correspondents’ Association: “Australia’s Relations with the South
Pacific.”9 The speech was subtitled “Challenge and Change,” but signifi-
cantly contained no changes or challenges for Australia, in stark contrast
to the self-reflective Evans address of 1988. It was a speech about how
“we” are seeing “your” problems. When “we” is used inclusively to mean
“we in the South Pacific” it is only in the context of what “we” have to
do about “your” problems.
Yet many of the problems the doomsdayists draw attention to in “the
South Pacific” are common in Australia. While Minister Bilney was point-
ing the finger at “expensive national symbols” in the region, and in par-
ticular at the national airlines, the Australian National (shipping) Line
was running at a massive loss, and it was clear that the government was
not prepared to make the hard decisions about it (Verrender and Davies
1994; Millett 1994). The attack on public authority mismanagement in
the island countries was launched after Australia had just been through a
series of high profile revelations about public authority mismanagement
and failure in Western Australia, South Australia, and Victoria, contribut-
ing to a change of government in each of those states. The continual cry
of the minister, and Callick and other journalists, that the island leaders
were selling out their future generations by not achieving higher returns
on the tuna fishery looked curious against the knowledge that, compared
to the Pacific Islands, Australia was receiving less return from the Japa-
nese fleets fishing for tuna off its east coast (Warnock 1995). Drawing
attention to the impact of climate change as an issue the Pacific Islands
would have to confront, when Australia was a significant contributor to
the problem (Riley 1994) and had worked against a meaningful global
regime, was disingenuous. Deforestation, and the failure of governments
to implement control policies, could have applied to Australia as much as
to the Solomon Islands. And finally, environmental problems in areas
such as coastal management, coral reef, and land degradation are at least
as serious in Australia as in the Pacific Islands.10
This is not to suggest that the existence of serious, and in many cases
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lar island countries any less serious. It should, however, introduce a little
humility and perhaps a caution about the way these issues are described.
For example, it is not commonly assumed in Australia that because the
Australian National Line has been poorly managed all public sector man-
agement is poor throughout Australia, or further, that this is due to some
essential quality of being Australian. Moreover, it would be less distanc-
ing, less sustaining of the division between “we” the successful managers
and “you” the failed Islanders, if Australian problems were also invoked.
This might also act as a reminder that many of these problems are en-
demic to the modern development process wherever it occurs.
The issue of inclusion also arises in relation to the extent to which, and
how, the doomsdayists encourage the participation of representatives of
the societies they are framing in the making of this new conception of
their reality. The total exclusion of Pacific Islanders from such a role was
a defining element of colonialism, and it remained remarkably intact as a
preconception of knowledge-making through the cold war years of the
postcolonial period. Although there was constant dialogue through the
South Pacific Forum, it was generally conducted within parameters already
established in an Australian conception. This presumption gradually came
under challenge from Pacific leaders. The acceptance of this challenge was
at least implied in Evans’s idea of “partnership” from 1988, although
there were still indications that he intended a partnership in which Aus-
tralian conceptual influence would remain dominant.
At one level the new doomsdayism appears to be a development of the
partnership notion. Minister Bilney, Callick, and the Pacific 2010 project
organizers were adamant that they are not seeking to prescribe, but just
to put facts before decision makers (Bilney 1994a). This suggests that
they envisage maximum participation by those whose past and future are
being conceptualized. They would argue that the ideas were discussed by
the leaders at the Forum or at conferences organized by Pacific 2010. But
this is misleading. What Pacific Island leaders were asked to participate in
was devising the strategies to deal with “the facts” established by the Aus-
tralian framers. The agenda was set. Thus, for example, although the
organizers sincerely envisaged Islander involvement, the three or four
island officials asked to the launching of the Pacific 2010 project were
asked to respond how they would deal with the facts established by the
project. In Lateline’s “Pacific Nightmare” program, the Pacific prime min-
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conception of Pacific reality already has the status of knowledge in the
minds of the Australian media, policymakers, and academics. Not only
do the framers exclude their own experiences from the frame, they also
exclude Pacific Islanders from participation in the framing of the new
conceptions of their past and future. This, I would argue, marks a contin-
uation of a long-standing practice that supports the subordination of those
depicted by the knowledge.
Framing and Certainty
Finally, there is the question of the degree to which the doomsdayists pre-
sented their perspective as the one true Pacific reality. Australians, like
other Europeans, have nearly always presented their conceptions of the
island world with great confidence. The conceptions of Pacific Islanders
as inferior races, or as doomed to extinction, were presented not as con-
tingent beliefs but with certainty based on science, or simply the given
starting point—that which is known. Although the nature of the charac-
terizations and conceptions of the island region changed over time, the
assumption was that some external reality had changed rather than the
premises of the knowledge makers.
I have already asserted that such a claim to truth is a central feature of
the way the new doomsdayism has been promoted and defended. Much
of its power and legitimacy is tied up in its presentation as unassailable
fact and authoritative knowledge. In the Pacific 2010 objectives, and
when the minister was downplaying the Australian desire to impose on
island societies, the stated aim was simply to put the facts before island
leaders so that they could make up their minds about the best course of
action (Bilney 1994a,13). In their more explicitly prescriptive moments,
where, for example, the minister or Callick set out what must be done if
certain doomsday were to be avoided (and, sotto voce, Australian aid to
be continued), they spoke with great certainty, as if there were no compet-
ing perspectives. As I have already demonstrated, this claim to truth is
built on shaky foundations in its assumption of an undifferentiated region,
in its construction of a fictitious island state and person, and in its
assumption that it is only describing a changing reality “out there” in the
Pacific, when the depicted reality is as much about a changing Australia.
This presumption of truth, underpinned by “indisputable facts,” can
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derived and represented is highly questionable. These are not just any
facts but those that provide the foundational evidence for the overall
depiction, those concerning economic growth and demographic patterns.
In their account of growth in gross domestic product, the new doomsday-
ists repeated the distortion in the World Bank’s representation of the expe-
rience of some island countries (excluding Papua New Guinea, for exam-
ple) as that of “the Pacific Islands” as a whole. Following the World
Bank, they also relied on averaging across the region (or six countries in
the region) over a decade. The conclusion drawn by the doomsdayists of
failure by all (or any one) of the island countries, on the basis of this mea-
sure, simply does not follow. To see the absurdity of this, one need only
ask what would have happened if this same averaging had been done for
1993 and had included Papua New Guinea. In 1993 Papua New Guinea
had the highest growth in gross domestic product in the world (14 per-
cent). Its inclusion would have given a completely distorted view of the
South Pacific average, but presumably on this basis the South Pacific
could be represented as a successful region heading toward paradise! Nor
can the central assumption of “poor economic and financial manage-
ment” be regarded as an indisputable fact. The World Bank, for example,
in its original statement of the Pacific paradox, referred to Pacific Island
management of the 1980s as “prudent.”
In relation to the demographic projections, I have already exposed the
distortion introduced by representing the population growth rates of five
countries as the experience of the whole South Pacific. Some Pacific
demographers have also mounted a substantial critique of the conclusions
drawn from the quantitative data in the doomsday projections and in
other similar regional studies (Hayes 1994, 1995; Pirie 1995a, 1995b;
Underhill-Sem 1994). Geoffrey Hayes, for example, has argued that there
is no relationship between Callick’s doomsday scenario and the demo-
graphic projections on which it is claimed to be based. The fundamental
assertion, that the population of the Pacific will double to 9 million by
2010 implies, Hayes argued, “an average annual growth rate of 4.1 per-
cent, a figure that appears nowhere in the following chapters [where the
demographic studies are presented] and is almost twice the current rate.”
Hayes also challenged the claimed causal link between population growth
and the projected maladies that form part of Callick’s doomsday image:
“the slump of commodity prices, the ‘islamicization’ of the culture, the
334 the contemporary pacific • fall 1997adoption of spicy foods, the loss of overseas trade concessions, the
collapse of public education, and the poor quality of Port Moresby’s
water supply” (1995, 193). Peter Pirie labeled the doomsday scenario
“fanciful,” drawing attention to the failure of its creators to appreciate
that the Pacific Islands “are far into a mortality transition, and all now
have shown declining fertility levels,” and further “that those with the
highest levels, Marshall Islands and Solomon Islands, show unmistakably
that they have passed their peak and are heading downward” (1995b,
188, 189).
A second challenge to the presumption of certain knowledge concerns
the appropriateness of the facts assembled as evidence of the correctness
of the depiction of the development situation. The problems of relying on
growth in gross domestic product as the indicator of island development
have been raised by Claire Slatter in her critique of the World Bank
approach (Slatter 1994) and by the Pacific prime ministers in their
comments on the doomsday picture in the abc Lateline program. The
reliance on an analysis centered on growth in gross domestic product
meant that the doomsdayists did not count the important subsistence
sector; they also missed the informal extraregional nature of island econo-
mies described by Hau‘ofa (1994).
To see how contestable are the conclusions the doomsdayists asserted
as certain knowledge, one need only imagine what the Australian concep-
tion would have looked like if it had been built on the assumptions of the
United Nations Development Program’s Pacific Human Development
Report (1994) instead of those employed in the World Bank reports
(1991, 1993). The Pacific Human Development Report accepted many of
the same tenets about problems in population growth and low economic
growth, but placed them in a different context. First, it did not see devel-
opment only in terms of crude growth. It valued other achievements, and
other indicators, of Pacific Island life. Second, it looked at the diversity of
experience across the Pacific. Third, it valued community participation in
development processes, and fourth, it placed value on equitable distribu-
tion. The result is an image of Islanders and island societies that is a
mixed report card, but one that did not resort to the reductionist and
alarmist approach of the Australian conception. It demonstrated achieve-
ments as well as problems. It showed that some island countries are rela-
tively high achievers on some indicators, pointing, for example, to the
dramatic increases in life expectancy that have been achieved in many of
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traditional family systems as a problem to be overcome if development
were to proceed, but as a source of strength. It also recognized the sub-
stantial obstacles facing island countries (undp 1994).
The United Nations Development Program’s quite different depiction
of the past and present development picture in the South Pacific was
embraced by all Pacific Island leaders in 1994, when the Human Develop-
ment Declaration, based on its conception, was signed by all leaders at
the Brisbane Forum. Its picture of island development was also cited by
President Ratu Mara of Fiji, a critic of the doomsdayist characterization
of past development achievements. He regarded the following account as
a useful corrective to the images of total failure associated with the
doomsdayists:
Considerable progress has been made in improving the quality of life and well-
being of people in the Pacific. There is generally a stable and secure civil envi-
ronment; people are living longer; opportunities for learning, improvement in
literacy and enhancement of human capabilities have increased; the subsis-
tence sector continues to support an adequate level of living for most of the
people; cash-earning opportunities have been generated in both the formal
and informal sectors of the economies. (undp in Mara 1994, 38–39)
The certainty with which solutions were put forward can also be chal-
lenged. Although the economic rationalist nostrums were presented as
uncomplicated, universally applicable strategies, there was silence on the
downside of the success stories elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region or the
Caribbean that were held out as models, for example, in the environmen-
tal areas held to be important in the doomsdayist position. There was also
no recognition of the incompatibility between objectives. The ideal was
held to be export-oriented industry like Western Samoa’s automotive
parts factory. If Kiribati, for example, were successful in attracting such
investment to Tarawa, which would be very difficult, the impact of over-
population around the capital and environmental problems in the lagoon
would be increased, not reduced. The advocacy of a strategy of moving
away from customary land tenure, large families, and traditions incom-
patible with capitalism, did not recognize that this is a gamble that only
pays off if the investment comes, the jobs are equitably distributed, and
the state redistributes to the needy, looks after the aged, and so on. It also
assumed that investment capital would not move on as lower cost sites
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ney’s electorate to Western Samoa). In the face of such uncertainty, the
presentation of such strategies as the only way to proceed was disingenu-
ous. There are implications for equity. To achieve a higher crude growth
rate would not necessarily raise most people’s living standards, and Pacific
Islanders would have to exchange a system of security that has served
them well—for an uncertain future.
Conclusion
For several generations Australians have generated powerful depictions of
a region they have variously called “the islands,” “the South Seas,” or
“the South Pacific,” and of the peoples who live there. I have proceeded
on the assumption, following Hau‘ofa, that this has mattered for island
societies. I have suggested that it is, therefore, important to think about
how such conceptualizations are generated and to ask what ethical judg-
ments might be made about the exercise of power inherent in this long-
standing practice. I have focused on the conception dominant in contem-
porary media, policy, and academic representations as a window onto
this practice.
There have been a variety of motivations involved in Australian
framings of the Pacific Islands: some have intended domination, others
have attempted to advance self-determination and development. The new
doomsdayism falls within the stream of thought motivated largely by
benevolent concern with raising living standards and self-determination,
although other interests to do with “regional stability” can also be dis-
cerned in the background. In this sense, it falls among missionary ap-
proaches to the islands—whether Christian, Marxist, or liberal. But, as I
have implied throughout, benevolent intent should not be the final word
in the ethical justification for hegemony. In the case of the new dooms-
dayism, the thrust of my argument is that benevolent intention is belied
by the subordinating assumptions embedded in the way in which this
knowledge is constructed. The doomsdayists, like earlier Australian
framers of the islands, are engaged in a system of knowledge that implic-
itly denies self-determination while claiming to advance it, and promotes
superiority and exclusion while claiming to advance equality. At the heart
of the new doomsdayism is the assumption of a special right to manage,
steeped in old racist premises, which are the most difficult to acknowl-
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does not represent the departure from the earlier representations asso-
ciated with the “smallness” notion that Hau‘ofa desires. Although its new
images of the region and of the potentialities of its inhabitants might at
first sight appear to mark such a departure, the underlying preconcep-
tions continue the subordination inherent in the development and security
discourses of the cold war era.
Nor is it sufficient or appropriate to base the ethical defense of hege-
mony in the claim to truth and the duty of sharing that truth. I have
attempted to show that such claims in the case of the new doomsdayism
are fundamentally flawed. The certainty with which the new depiction
has been put forward, the evangelical tone with which it has been pro-
moted, and the dramatic and exaggerated imagery associated with it, sug-
gest that the answer may lie as much in a changing Australian imagina-
tion as in a changing reality “out there.” Second, the conception is built
on unacknowledged assumptions about an abstract region and the exist-
ence of an essential island leader. Third, it denies whole aspects of Pacific
Island experiences. This is not to deny the existence of significant prob-
lems in particular places of the kind described in the general portrait. Nor
is it to deny the right of Australians to speak and represent island life. But
if Australian knowledge of the South Pacific is to avoid the charge of
hegemonic and belittling thought, there will have to be recognition of the
subordinating preconceptions that continue to underlie Australian framings
of the Pacific Islands.
* * *
I am indebted to the participants of the Pacific History Conference held
on South Tarawa in July 1994 for their comments on an earlier version of
this argument, and to those who participated in a seminar in the Depart-
ment of International Relations at the Australian National University in
October 1995 for their views on a more developed version. I would par-
ticularly like to thank those who commented on an earlier draft: Bill
Standish, Cindy O’Hagan, Gavin Mount, Nicholas Thomas, Peter Van
Ness, James Richardson, Terence Wesley-Smith, and Jindy Pettman. I am
also indebted to Gordon Briscoe for his challenging conversations on the
parallels to be found in white Australia’s framing of Aborigines and for
his skepticism about accounts of imperialism that privilege the ideational
over the material world.
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1 I use the term new doomsdayism to distinguish this from earlier doomsday-
ist depictions of the Pacific Islands: by missionaries, by those concerned with
what was seen as the dying out of the native races, and more recently by those
drawing attention to the possible plight of some atolls if climate change predic-
tions come true.
2 The most important expressions of the doomsdayist characterization in-
clude Rowan Callick’s “Pacific 2010: A Doomsday Scenario?” (1993). See, in
particular, Cole 1993, and Cole and Tambunlertchai 1993, the speeches and
interviews of Minister for Pacific Islands Affairs the Honorable Gordon Bilney
(especially Bilney 1994a, b, and 1995b); and Rowan Callick’s articles on these
themes in the Australian Financial Review and Islands Business Pacific (1994a,
b, c, d, e, and 1995).
3 See Tate 1961; McQueen 1970, 61–67; Thompson 1980.
4 See for example, Briscoe 1993 and Rowley 1972.
5 In 1993–94 Australia gave $339 million to Papua New Guinea, constituting
24 percent of total Australian official development assistance. It also gave $126
million to the other Pacific Island countries (Fiji, $23 million; Vanuatu, $16 mil-
lion; Solomon Islands, $14 million; Western Samoa, $12 million; Tonga, $11 mil-
lion; Kiribati, $7 million; Nauru, $3 million; Tuvalu, $3 million; other and
regional, $37 million (Bilney 1995a, table 1).
6 I explore the influence of the regional reform agenda promoted by Australia
on the basis of the doomsdayist conception in Fry 1994 and 1997.
7 For the rejection by the three prime ministers of the extremes of
the doomsday scenario see the Australian Broadcasting Commission’s Lateline
program (1994); for Geoffrey Henry’s more extensive criticism see Pacific
Report, 15 August 1994; for Mamaloni’s criticism see O’Callaghan (1994b).
For Ratu Mara’s skepticism about the doomsday depiction see Mara (1994,
37–43). Mahathir’s objections are in the Sydney Morning Herald, 6 August
1994, 23 (“Mahathir Hits Back at Keating on Logging”); the Japanese
Embassy’s publicized concerns were reported by Craig Skehan in Prime
Minister Billy Hilly’s press conference at the South Pacific Forum, Bris-
bane, 2 August 1994; and the South Korean government’s objections were in a
statement handed out at the South Pacific Conference, Vila, October 1994
(Keun 1994).
8 A change of government in March 1996 did not affect the regional reform
strategy or the dominant imagery employed in the approach of the key sections
of the government or academia. If anything, the new conservative government of
Prime Minister Howard pursued the regional reform agenda more vigorously
and linked the continuation of Australian aid more explicitly to Pacific Island
acceptance of this agenda. This discussion, however, focuses on the period 1994–
fry • australian images of the south pacific 3391996 under the Labor Government, as the main elements of the new depiction
were worked out during that time.
9 Curiously, however, at the same time Australia was placing itself outside the
South Pacific boundary in the new doomsdayism, it placed itself firmly inside
when it came to leading the Pacific campaign against the renewal of French
nuclear testing at Moruroa and Fangataufa.
10 See, for example, Alexander and Taylor (1996) in which the findings of the
State of the Environment report are summarized.
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Abstract
For several generations Australians have generated powerful depictions of a
region they have variously called “the islands,” “the South Seas,” or “the South
Pacific.” The most recent characterization is embedded in a forthright salvation-
ist message that warns of an approaching “doomsday” or “nightmare” unless
Pacific Islanders remake themselves—just as Australians have had to. Like earlier
Australian depictions, the “new doomsdayism” sets up Pacific Islanders for out-
comes not of their making. While the images of “the region” and of the poten-
tialities of its inhabitants might at first sight appear to mark a departure from the
subordination inherent in the development and security discourses of the cold
war era, the underlying preconceptions suggest that it implicitly denies self-deter-
mination while claiming to advance it, and promotes superiority and exclusion
while claiming to advance equality. At the heart of the new doomsdayism is the
344 the contemporary pacific • fall 1997assumption of a special right to manage, steeped in old racist assumptions that
are the most difficult to acknowledge.
The certainty with which the new depiction has been put forward, the evan-
gelical tone with which it has been promoted, and the dramatic and exaggerated
imagery associated with it suggest that the answer may lie as much in a changing
Australian imagination as in a changing reality “out there.” This is not to deny
the existence of significant problems in particular places of the kind described in
the general portrait. Nor is it to deny the right of Australians to represent island
life. But if Australian knowledge of the South Pacific is to avoid the charge of
hegemonic and belittling thought, there will have to be recognition of the sub-
ordinating preconceptions that continue to underlie Australian framings of “the
islands.”
keywords: colonialism, doomsdayism, economic development, identity, image-
making, policy formation, power structures
